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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyse what different types of populist communication styles emerged 
during the 2014 EP election campaign and under which conditions political parties selected specific 
populist communication styles. To do this, a comparative quantitative content analysis of press releas-
es in the run-up of the latest EP elections has been conducted for parties in France, Germany, Austria 
and Greece. The paper presents a definition of populism based on the contemporary academic dis-
course, which focuses on the transnational nature of the European political field. It is shown that popu-
list party communication is more pronounced on the fringes of the political spectrum and in countries 
struggling with severe macroeconomic difficulties. Contrary to intuitive expectations, the perceived 
populist rhetoric of exclusivity in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis, which is identified 
as a central feature of right-wing populism, barely takes place within populist party communication.  
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Drivers of populism – A four-country comparison of party communication in the run-up to the 
2014 European Parliament elections 
Introduction 
Over the last decade, European democracies have faced the challenges of parties and movements that 
are commonly referred to as being ‘populist.’ In several EU-member states, the European financial and 
sovereign debt crisis created fertile soil for parties that use populist rhetoric. José Manuel Barroso, 
former president of the European Commission, emphasised his increased unease concerning these 
developments when he spoke at the annual Brussels Think Tank Forum on April 22, 2013: ‘I am deep-
ly concerned about the divisions that we see emerging: political extremes and populism tearing apart 
the political support and the social fabric that we need to deal with the crisis […]’ (Barroso, 2013). 
Indeed, European elites seem to be increasingly worried by these recent developments, which are per-
ceived as an impending stress test for the Union and the project of European integration as a whole 
(Hartleb, 2013). As populist communication growingly permeates European politics, it becomes cru-
cial to encompass this phenomenon and shed light on the nature of populist party communication it-
self. What different forms of populist communication styles emerge in the context of a transnational 
European political arena? To what extent is this populist rhetoric employed by political parties? And 
what factors or conditions are constitutive for a party’s selection of a specific type of populism? To 
this effect, the aim of this study is to identify and to explain the usage of different populist communi-
cation styles by political parties during the 2014 EP election campaign.  
However, systematic comparative analyses of populist communication are scarce (Rooduijn and 
Pauwels, 2011), as most of the existing empirical investigations of populism are single case studies 
(e.g. Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2008). This is a consequence of the lack of conceptual clarity that 
goes along with populism (Barr, 2009; Canovan, 1999; Taggart, 2000) due to its contextual sensitivity. 
Thus, this paper empirically contributes to the field of populist communication research by employing 
a comparative research design in order to assess the determinants for the selection of populist commu-
nication styles. The theoretical considerations are empirically tested for 28 political parties in Austria, 
Germany, France and Greece in the run-up of the 2014 EP elections. At that time, all countries in-
volved in the study found themselves in a post-crisis environment still coming to terms with the Euro-
pean debt crisis. However, the crisis’ economic, political and social implications have been signifi-
cantly more incisive for the latter two countries than for Austria and Germany. On this note, the study 
not only allows for a consideration of decisive party specific factors but also tentatively addresses 
potential effects of a crisis-hit environment on the selection of populist communication styles.  
To measure populism within party communication, I fall back on the conception of Jagers and 
Walgrave (2007), who perceive populism as a political communication style composed of three rhetor-
ical elements: an appeal to the people in combination with criticism on the establishment and/or the 
exclusion of others. However, because this study is interested in populist party communication related 
to the European election context, it furthermore accommodates for the aforementioned context sensi-
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tivity of populism by considering that the Europeanization of the (national) political arena necessitates 
an additional specification of populist elements. Political parties may either allude to a national or 
European demos and likewise direct their criticism to either the domestic or the EU establishment (see 
Reungoat, 2010). This level to which people references are made is connected with an overall identifi-
cation of the general public with the European Union. Hence, this analysis also gives attention to 
whether there has been the emergence of Pro-European populism (manifested through an explicit 
appeal to the European community) that might be countervailing putative exclusionary tendencies in 
the environment of the European financial crisis. News reports about recent crisis developments in-
creasingly convey an image of nations divided into ‘debtor’ and ‘creditor’ states, whose peoples are 
incriminating and vilifying each other. By analysing populist party communication styles in the con-
text of the 2014 EP elections, this study may shed light on whether this perceived rhetoric of exclu-
sivity towards others might be driven by political parties.  
This paper is structured as follows. I first describe the three constituting elements of populism and 
– emerging from the combinations of these elements – identify different types of populist communica-
tion. The paper hereby focuses on the transnational nature of the European political field and its impli-
cations on populism. Second, I make assumptions concerning party positions and situational factors 
that determine a party’s usage of a particular type and level of populism. Third, the paper describes 
dependent and independent model variables for the usage of populist communication styles, which is 
estimated with a series of linear OLS regressions. Fourth, the paper presents descriptive statistics and 
the main findings from multivariate analysis. Finally, the paper concludes by discussing the implica-
tions of the results and by drawing an overall conclusion.  
Definition of populism and specification to the European context 
Following Priester (2012), populism is considered as a relational concept, that refers to a relationship 
between at least two entities and describes an antagonism between friend and foe. At its very core lies 
the constructed in-group of ‘the people’, which is opposed to two different out-groups: ‘the elites’ on a 
vertical dimension and ‘the dangerous others’ on a horizontal dimension. In spite of the relative scarci-
ty of systematic methods to empirically measure populism, other scholars have been successful in 
doing so either by quantitative text analysis (e.g. Pauwels, 2011) or by classical content analysis (Ja-
gers and Walgrave, 2007; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011; Rooduijn et al., 2012). Jagers and Walgrave 
(2007) were among the first to do so, thereby inspiring a number of other studies on populist political 
communication (e.g. Aalberg et al., 2017; Vasilopoulou et al., 2014; Reungoat 2010). They identify 
three rhetorical elements of a populist communication style. The first and most important is the refer-
ence to the people. Populism appeals to and identifies with the people and justifies its actions in doing 
so. The second element is an establishment-critique, which emphasises the distance and estrangement 
between the ordinary people and the corrupt elites ‘up there’. The third constitutive element is the 
rhetorical exclusion of certain societal groups that do not feature the good characteristics of the alleg-
edly homogenous and pure people and are, thus, perceived as dangerous or disruptive for society (Ja-
gers and Walgrave, 2007). 
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While some scholars argue that the strategy of exclusion is merely a central feature of radical right-
wing populism (e.g. Canovan, 1999; Rooduijn et al., 2012; Taggart, 2000), Jagers and Walgrave 
(2007) propose that all constitutive elements are considered as features of a political style rather than 
being bound to a distinct ideology. However, the two claims are not mutually exclusive. Every popu-
list party, regardless of its position on the political spectrum, may apply both anti-establishment as 
well as exclusive elements, while it might still be the case that either one or the other pole of the spec-
trum is more likely to apply a certain type of populism. Kriesi and Pappas (2015a, pp. 5-6) point out 
that it is ‘complementary to the definition of populism as an ideology’ to perceive populism as a polit-
ical communication style because the populist ideology ‘manifests itself in specific discursive pat-
terns’.1 A further aim of this study is to back this argumentation through empirical evidence. 
Jagers and Walgrave (2007) distinguish between a thin and a thick concept of populism. In its thick 
conceptualization, populism is a combination of all three elements, i.e. a political actor’s reference to 
the people and explicitly expressed anti-elite feelings and the exclusion of other individuals or groups 
(Jagers and Walgrave, 2007). Thinly defined populism consists of only the first element and it is un-
derstood as being a necessary pre-condition for populism, as well as a ‘normal political style adopted 
by all politicians from all times’ (2007, p. 232). Using words like ‘(the) public,’ ‘(the) citizens,’ ‘(the) 
voters,’ etc. is described as a standard communication technique and part of the normal political dis-
course. However, although populism would indeed be unthinkable without any kind of appeal to the 
people, it is almost impossible for a political actor to reach out to the electorate without displaying 
closeness to the people. Thus, in the definition used in this analysis, a sole people reference is, in con-
trast to Jagers and Walgrave (2007), not perceived as a sufficient condition for substantive populism 
and – due to its lacking in content – does not qualify a discourse as being populist. Because populism 
is defined as a relational concept, a reference to the people has to be combined with at least one of the 
other two elements of populist rhetoric.  
Following the conceptualization of Roodujin and colleagues (2012) populism is conceived as the 
property of a message rather than the property of the actor sending this message, which implies that a 
political actor per se cannot be qualified as being either populist or not populist. Instead, a political 
actor may be classified as being more or less populist than another political actor depending on how 
many populist messages the actor has released. By an evaluation of the quantity of populist messages 
and the different elements of populism comprised within, it is possible to assess whether – in the ag-
gregate – a political actor is using a type of populism that is predominantly thin, thick, rather anti-
elitist, or rather exclusionary. Based on the definition of Jagers and Walgrave (2007) the following 
types of populism can be distinguished:  
Thin populism: (1) people reference 
Anti-elitist populism: (1) people reference and (2) elite critique 
Exclusive populism:   (1) people reference and (3) exclusion 
Anti-elitist & exclusive (thick) populism: (1) people reference and (2) elite critique and  
 (3) exclusion 
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Furthermore, to analyse different types of populist communication in Europe, it is crucial to recog-
nise that an appeal to ‘the people’ may be addressed to different target groups depending on the per-
ceived identity of the actor sending the message. The transnational nature of European Integration 
influences the population’s identity perceptions in several ways. While some groups fear a loss of their 
national identity due to the process of Europeanization, there is in turn evidence for the emergence of a 
European Identity (e.g. Bruter, 2005; Lutz et al., 2006). As Dechezelles and Neumayer (2010) point 
out, European Integration transcends the distinction between national and transnational political fields, 
and the impact of the new European level of representation on national politics cannot be neglected. 
Populist political actors not only criticise their own national elites but intentionally use EU institutions 
to illustrate the opposition between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’. Anti-establishment feelings may thus 
be addressed explicitly to the national elites or explicitly to the elites of the European Union. Similar-
ly, Kriesi and Pappas (2015b) point out that while populists are usually attacking the national elites, in 
the course of the sovereign debt crisis the supranational elites or elites from other EU member states 
may have become the target of populist criticism.  
Determinants for the different forms of populism 
Party position on the political spectrum  
Contrary to the common association of populism with parties from the radical Right, Rooduijn and 
Akkerman (2015) empirically demonstrate that it is not a party’s left-right position, but its radicalness 
that determines the extent of populist rhetoric. According to them, parties on both poles of the political 
spectrum are inclined to challenge the political elites because they are peripheral vis-à-vis their party 
systems and can present themselves as diametrically opposed to the allegedly negligent establishment 
parties. Because anti-democratic and radical parties have largely been deprecated after the end of Sec-
ond World War, populism has moreover ‘become an increasingly attractive alternative’ that consti-
tutes a chance of ‘finding new, more respectable profiles’ and regaining legitimacy among voters 
(Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015, pp. 3-4). It can thus be expected that:  
H1:  Parties settled either on the right or the left pole of the traditional political spectrum use more 
populist communication styles than mainstream parties. 
To understand, however, why varying populist elements are employed within the radical parties’ 
campaigning during the EP elections, it is helpful to analyse their party positions in light of the Euro-
pean integration process. With regards to content, there is a striking overlap between the three ele-
ments of populism and the activated issues in the context of the politicization of the EU. In line with 
globalization, the process of European integration created groups of winners and losers through an 
enhanced economic, cultural and political competition (Kriesi et al., 2006). In the course of this, a new 
conflict between integration and demarcation emerged, which according to Kriesi et al. (2006) reflects 
this antagonism between the two groups of winners and losers. Representing the losers of globaliza-
tion, left-wing and right-wing extremist parties are the ones most strongly opposed to denationaliza-
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tion in Europe, as a party’s support for European integration declines with its distance from the center 
of the political spectrum (Hooghe et al., 2002; Taggart, 1998).  
The radical Left’s deeply entrenched opposition to the opening up of borders basically derives from 
the economic contradictoriness of their policy goals to the market-liberal nature of the European pro-
ject (Kriesi et al. 2006; Heine 2010). The integration process weakened the authority of the nation 
states (e.g. Börzel and Risse, 2000; see Hooghe et al., 2002) and gradually suppressed, loosened, and 
disrupted arrangements, such as the various designs and redistribution policies of national social wel-
fare states. Equivalent new arrangements at the supranational level, in contrast, were not always creat-
ed in a sufficient way (Bartolini, 2005). The design of the European Treaties is favouring market-
deepening policies while simultaneously impeding measures for market-correction and are, therefore, 
incompatible with the policy goals of the radical Left (Hooghe et al., 2002; e.g. Scharpf, 1999). With 
regard to the demarcation/integration conflict, peripheral actors on the Left are thus highly protection-
ist on a socio-economic dimension (Kriesi et al., 2006). In addition, the attenuation of the nation 
state’s authority also reduced the impact of national participation forms in the collective decision-
making process (Heine, 2010). As a matter of principle, parties from the radical Left perceive the EU 
as ‘an imperialist power contradicting the basic principles of autonomy and national self-
determination’ and a ‘vehicle for elite and great power domination’ (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012, p. 
512). Therefore, these parties resolutely criticise the democratic deficit of the European Union and – 
since the process of European integration has been a project driven by elites from its very start (Tag-
gart 1998) – their critique is directed to the established political class held responsible for these devel-
opments.  
Political parties from the radical Right too complain about the EU’s democratic deficit, accuse the 
EU elites of corruption, and blame EU institutions for inefficiency. However, the radical Right’s basic 
orientations are traditionalism and anti-immigration, and their opposition to the EU is based on an 
exclusive, ethnic nationalism (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012). The construction of European nation states 
in the twentieth century forged strong cultural links amongst their members and established cultural 
boundaries through the formation of national identities (Heine, 2010). With the beginning of the Euro-
pean integration process, these boundaries have been softened and have called into question the cul-
tural homogeneity of the member states. Radical right-wing parties fear the loss of national identity 
and see themselves as defending national community and culture against foreigners (e.g. Kitschelt and 
McGann, 1995). With respect to the demarcation/integration conflict, they are therefore distinctly 
protectionist on a cultural dimension (Kriesi et al., 2006). Their objection to the opening up of borders 
in the course of European integration is strongly linked to their opposition to apprehended immigra-
tion on the principle of free movement of persons and the prospective enlargement to the East. For fear 
of any kind of social and cultural competition, parties from the radical Right are not only demanding a 
re-establishment of national border controls, but also stricter border controls at the EU’s outer borders 
to prevent immigration from third countries (see Hooghe et al., 2002). Thus, it can be expected that:  
  
 7 
H2:  In the populist communication of radical parties from the Left, an anti-elitist type of 
populism is predominant while the element of exclusion is neglected; in addition to the 
classical anti-elitist type of populism, radical parties from the Right apply the element of 
exclusion more visibly (i.e. an exclusive or a thick type of populism).  
To what level, however, do the political parties allude when they apply these populist elements? To 
what particular demos an appeal to ‘the people’ may be addressed depends on the identity perception 
of the actor sending the message. According to Herrmann and Brewer (2004), individuals hold multi-
ple identities that may relate to each other in different ways. If an individual belongs to several distinct 
groups with non-overlapping memberships, this person’s group identities are essentially separate or 
exclusive. Furthermore, a nested identity configuration is possible if an individual of a smaller com-
munity is simultaneously part of a larger community and identifies with both of them. With regard to 
the European Union, an individual may feel both as a citizen of its nation state and as a citizen of the 
EU, thereby featuring an inclusive European identity. In the European context, people may also simply 
feel as citizens of their own nation state without any sense of belonging to the European Union at all, 
holding an exclusive national identity. Accordingly, political parties are expected to represent these 
identity perceptions of their electorate. McLaren (2007) further analysed the connection between con-
cerns about the loss of national identity and perceptions of EU institutions. In her analysis, she points 
out that an exclusive national identity has a significant effect on hostility to EU institutions and signif-
icantly enhances opposition to the European integration project. In this sense, exclusive national iden-
tity perceptions may in fact bring supranational elites within the focus of the populist establishment 
critique. Corresponding to their basic orientation towards ethnic nationalism, radical right parties 
mainly represent a constituency with an exclusive national identity. Therefore, it is expected that:  
H3a:  Radical parties from the Right predominantly apply a populist communication style 
comprising an appeal or reference to their own national community. Their elite critique is 
furthermore expected to be predominately directed at the EU elites. 
In contrast, mainstream parties tend to be pro-European and supportive of the European integration 
process; thus, they are expected to represent an electorate that is likely to hold an inclusive European 
identity. However, radical parties from the Left, albeit being opposed to the current arrangement of 
economic integration, are of a very pro-European nature as well, as their vision of Europe is based on 
a predominantly communitarian perspective. Their scepticism with regard to denationalization is based 
on a civic nationalism against perceived imperialist powers, but it is nonetheless inclusive and voli-
tional, and it does not emphasise the homogeneity of the own nation (Halikiopoulou et al., 2012). First 
and foremost, the radical Left considers a moral community – and this might as well be Europe – es-
sential for the functioning of a democratic entity and a redistributive social system (Heine, 2010). 
However, despite the fact that parties from the radical Left do hold distinct identity perceptions, Hei-
ne’s content analysis (2010) of party manifestos from the French radical Left revealed that left-wing 
critiques against the European Union are predominantly based on arguments concerning the socioeco-
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nomic or political nature of the EU, while identity matters play a secondary role within their discourse 
on the European project. With regard to their populist party communication, it is thus expected that: 
 H3b: Radical parties from the Left predominantly apply a populist communication style 
comprising a people reference directed to ‘the people’ in general, without explicit appeals to 
specific target groups. If, however, their people reference is addressing a particular demos, it 
is expected that they are predominantly appealing to the European community. 
Situational party- and country-specific factors 
Ideological and policy stances of political parties are party-inherent and are more or less stable over 
time. However, certain situational or temporary factors may additionally influence the extent and type 
of populism a party applies. During election campaigns, governing parties are part of the establish-
ment themselves, and – being in constant proceedings with the EU elites due to their role as represent-
atives of their country – it stands to reason that compared to opposition or non-parliamentary parties 
they are more likely to avoid populist communication styles while in office. The findings of Kriesi & 
Pappas (2015b) that populist parties tone down their messages when presumably or effectively in 
power are consistent with these thoughts. However, this does not mean that ruling parties are not pro-
ducing any elite critiques at all. In any case, one must keep in mind that governing parties are perform-
ing as national elites and, hence, do not have any incentive to criticise themselves during an election 
campaign. In consideration of this rationale, it is expected that: 
H4: Parties in government use less populism in general, and in particular they apply significantly 
less criticism on the national elites than parties without government participation.  
Apart from government participation, some external forces may influence a country’s climate of 
political communication as a whole. Populism seems to be the product of crisis, mobilization, and 
confrontation. The idiosyncratic shape of the European sovereign debt crisis entailed additional and 
more specific points of criticism to correspond with the three elements of a populist communication 
style. European and domestic elites have been under attack for unpopular crisis management arrange-
ments, and for backing the temporary implementation of technocratic governments in Greece and Ita-
ly, which fundamentally questioned the national sovereignty of countries. The crisis has demanded 
increased solidarity between the European member states and has evoked national cleavages between 
‘donor’ and ‘debtor’ countries, while the adverse state of the economy has generated and intensified 
feelings of ostracism and exclusion (Hartleb, 2012; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015a). In line with these con-
siderations, the analysis of Kriesi and Pappas (2015b) also largely supported that economic and politi-
cal crises have a reinforcing effect on populism. Thus, it is expected that: 
H5a: Parties in countries heavily affected by crisis are prone to apply more populism in their party 
communication, and in particular they are using the exclusive element more visibly than 
parties within a less crisis-ridden environment. 
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As Brubaker (2011) points out, the European financial crisis has already generated plenty of na-
tionalism on the rhetorical level. Based on the urge to protect the national community in view of puta-
tive economic threats from outsiders, economic crises not only provoke and intensify exclusive feel-
ings, they are often associated with a great deal of nationalism. With regard to the level of populist 
party communication, it is therefore expected that: 
H5b: Parties from crisis-hit countries more visibly appeal to the national community compared to 
parties within countries that are only mildly affected by crisis. 
Two approaches were made to verify these assumptions. First, I analysed party-specific frequency 
distributions of populist elements in each party’s press releases. Thus, it was possible to compare na-
tional characteristics of populist party communications, while at the same time gaining insight into 
party-specific variations in populist communication styles within a country. In order to statistically test 
the assumptions, linear Ordinary Least Squares regression was used to calculate the impact of each of 
the independent variables on the use of different populist communication styles, thereby illustrating an 
overall trend of party position effects on populism apart from country-specific appearances. 
Measurement 
Data source and measurement of populist communication 
To test the assumptions discussed above, press releases from all political parties that reached more 
than 3% in the last national or European elections were collected for Germany, Austria, Greece, and 
France for the 12-week period prior to the 2014 European elections. Only press releases that referred 
to the terms EU and/or Europ*/europ* and/or relevant acronyms of EU actors, institutions or policies 
(f. ex.: EP, EZB, ESM etc.) at least twice were included in the analysis in order to limit coding materi-
al to topics relevant to the context of EP election campaigns. Thereby, a full survey of relevant press 
releases (N=1934) from a total of 28 political parties was obtained and subsequently analysed through 
a quantitative content analysis. The statement of the actor who published the press release (which can 
be identified either as a party or a specific political actor) was considered as the unit of analysis.  
In order to encompass populism, the three variables of people reference, elite critique, and exclu-
sion were constructed based on the definition of Jagers and Walgrave (2007).2 To take into account the 
specific context of a European political area, the variables were then further specified so as to precise-
ly assess the target of the appeal, criticism, or exclusion. The first step was to evaluate whether there 
was an explicit reference to the people in the party’s statement. If the sender was mentioned within the 
press release as a specific political actor, coders were asked to specify whether this was a national or 
EU actor and whether he directed his appeal explicitly to a national, European or unknown communi-
ty. To qualify as a reference to the people, the actor’s statement had to fulfil two criteria: the statement 
had to feature the explicit mentioning of a specific population or population group (f. ex. ‘the Greek,’ 
‘the nation,’ ‘Europeans.’ ‘tax payers,’ ‘voters,’ etc.) and, through his statement, the actor had to either 
advocate for or explicitly side with these people or had to support their concerns or claims. A people 
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reference was also coded if the actor spoke in the name of the mentioned population (or group) by 
allegedly expressing this people’s attitude.  
 
Example: explicit mentioning of and advocacy for a specific population group 3 
‘We simply cannot go on like this if we are to even begin the task of restoring the living standards and com-
munity cohesion available to millions of hardworking British families.’ (Nigel Farage of UKIP, 22 May 
2014) 
Example: explicit mentioning of a specific population group and allegedly expressing this groups attitude 
‘Voters are sick and tired of the same old business-as-usual politics and they are voting Green because they 
know that a Green vote is a vote for real change for the common good. They are realising we are the party of-
fering the most just and sustainable future for the whole of Britain and the planet.’ (Natalie Bennett of The 
Greens, 24 May 2014)  
 
If a people reference could be identified within the press release (and only then), the subsequent 
variables of elite critique and/or exclusion were coded if they appeared in the text. Following Jagers 
and Walgrave (2007), the anti-establishment variable took into account any criticism towards political 
elites, specific policies and/or polities, or the system as a whole. Furthermore, critiques directed at 
economic or cultural elites – e.g. central banks, intellectuals, or the media – were factored in. Coders 
were asked to specify whether the target of criticism was either the establishment of the speaker’s own 
country, the establishment of another specific EU-member state, the EU-elites in general or any oth-
er/unspecified establishment. Elite critique was understood as a negative evaluation of the establish-
ment, either in terms of discreditation or accusations, or – in cases where there were no negative at-
tributions – in the form of denied positive attributes; for example, an explicit rejection of praise or 
appreciation for the establishment. 
 
Example: criticism towards political elites in terms of accusation and negative evaluation of governmental  
performance 
‘David Cameron has broken his solemn promise to the British people on one of the most important political 
issues. And he has done so because he refuses to take back control of our borders in respect of more than 400 
million people from more than two dozen countries on continental Europe.’ (Nigel Farage of UKIP, 22 May 
2014)  
Example: criticism towards political elites in terms of discreditation and accusation 
‘After years of being ignored by the out-of-touch political elite, after years of watching our Green and Pleas-
ant Land turned into a bankrupt, crime-ridden, Third World slum – it’s time to hit back and tell the greedy, 
useless politicians exactly how you feel!’ (Press Release of the BNP, 22 May 2014) 
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The exclusion variable asked whether the actor’s statement followed an exclusion strategy by ex-
plicitly criticizing one or multiple nations or groups in society – namely immigrants, asylum seekers, 
or minorities. This variable searched for criticism addressed to a nation or a group in society as a 
whole and excluded criticism directed solely to a nation’s establishment (i.e. its government or other 
elites). Again, the actor’s statement had to explicitly mention a population, nation, or group in society 
(although, this time, the actor himself could not be part of that group). This exclusive criticism could 
consist of several means for negative attribution, such as verbal discreditation, stigmatization, and/or 
degradation. It was furthermore perceived as exclusion if that population group or nation was blamed, 
accused, or described as a threat, menace, or source of harassment for the community.  
 
Example: exclusive criticism on immigrants by describing them as a harassment for the national    
community 
‘[…] – it’s time to hit back and tell the greedy, useless politicians exactly how you feel! Just remember all 
the times you’ve been so angry at the latest scandal of illegal immigrants getting benefits and legal aid while 
our people are left to rot.’ (Press Release of the BNP, 22 May 2014) 
 
The content analysis has been carried out by three native coders for press releases from Germany 
and Austria, two native coders for France and one native coder for Greece. All coders were trained in 
English to ensure a consistent training procedure. A short introduction acquainted coders with the 
concept of populism and the specifications of the project’s variables. Each variable’s researcher-coder 
reliability was tested according to the Krippendorff’s α-coefficient by conducting a reliability test 
(also in English), which included 25 press releases. By matching the results of each coder to a master-
coding scheme (which I specified in advance), it was possible to illustrate how adequate coders afield 
were able to assess the concepts in the same way as they are understood by the researcher. For the 
formal variables (i.e. country, date of publishing, and sending party), all coders achieved average 
Krippendorff’s α values between 0.83 and 1.00. Furthermore, reliability values of the Greek and 
French coders were also satisfactory for the three populism variables. On average, the two French 
coders achieved Krippendorff’s coefficients of α = 0.85 for people reference, 0.76 for elite critique, 
and 0.84 for the exclusion-variable. The Greek coder obtained Krippendorff’s values of α = 0.93 for 
people reference, 0.73 for elite critique, and 0.87 for the exclusion-variable. However, the three Ger-
man-speaking coders achieved sufficient averaged coefficients for people reference (0.91) and elite 
critique (0.76), but the average Krippendorff’s α value for the exclusion-variable turned out to be too 
low (0.44) even after a second reliability test was conducted. Therefore, as to not delay the start of the 
coding process for the broader project, I decided to code this variable ex post by myself. The intra-
coder reliability test I conducted resulted in an adequate Krippendorff’s α-coefficient of 0.89.  
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Dependent variable 
I created seven scales in total to assess the parties’ use of various types of populist communication 
styles and the elements comprised within. The percentage value of press releases that contained popu-
lism (i.e. press releases that featured a people reference and an anti-elitist and/or exclusive statement) 
in proportion to the total amount of all press releases a party had published within the 12-week period 
prior to the EP elections was assigned to each party, respectively, to create a general scale for populist 
communication popcom. In the same line, I created scales for an anti-elitist and for an exclusive popu-
list communication style by assigning to each party the percentage value of press releases containing 
anti-elitist or exclusive populism, respectively, in proportion to the total number of press releases per 
party. Populist communication was considered anti-elitist if a press release contained a people refer-
ence and an anti-establishment stance without any exclusive element. A communication style was 
considered exclusive if an exclusive stance could be identified in combination with a people reference, 
irrespective of an additional elite critique or not.4 Two more scales were generated to assess how many 
populist press releases featured a people reference directed to the national people (NATpop) and to the 
EU people (EUpop), respectively. Here, too, the reference point for the assigned percentage values 
was the total number of a party’s published press releases. However, for these two scales, only the 
people references and their addressees were of primary interest and not the specific targets of elite 
criticism; it was mandatory that all press releases featured an additional anti-establishment and/or ex-
clusive element to exclude ‘thin populism’ from the scale. Eventually, two scales were created to de-
termine how many of the populist press releases featured criticism of the national elites (NATantiest) 
and of the European elites (EUantiest), respectively.5 Neither the specific direction of the people refer-
ence nor the existence or absence of any exclusive element was relevant for these two scales. In con-
trast to the other populism scales, each party was assigned the percentage value of press releases that 
contained elite critiques on the respective target in proportion to a party’s amount of published press 
releases containing (any kind of) elite critique. 
 
Independent variables 
As measures for a party’s ideological position and its positioning on European integration, I used data 
from the 2014 Chapel Hill expert survey (see Bakker et al., 2015), which relies on placements by aca-
demic experts. The following item was used to assess the Left/Right placement in the political spec-
trum: ‘Please tick the box that best describes each party’s overall ideology on a scale ranging from 0 
(extreme Left) to 10 (extreme Right).’ For the analysis, I then created three dummy variables so as to 
be able to compare populist communication styles not only between left- or right-wing parties but also 
more generally between fringe and center parties. I classified parties featuring values ≤ 2.5 as left-
wing; parties featuring values ≥ 7.5 as right-wing, and parties featuring values ranking from 2.6 to 7.4 
as center. To control for government participation, I included a dummy variable for parties in office in 
the multivariate analysis, thereby relying on the Parliaments and governments database ParlGov, 
which includes data on elections and cabinets in established democracies since 1945 (see Döring and 
Manow, 2015).6 
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I separated the four countries under study into ‘crisis-spared countries’ and ‘crisis-hit countries’ 
and included a dummy variable in the analysis. Germany and Austria are considered as ‘crisis-spared,’ 
while France and Greece are considered as ‘crisis-hit’. As a proxy for crisis-affectedness, I primarily 
used macroeconomic data from Eurostat for the last three years (2012 – 2014) such as a country’s 
youth unemployment and unemployment rate, the percentage of growth in the nation’s real gross do-
mestic product (GDP) per capita, a country’s government deficit/surplus, and its government debt as a 
percentage of GDP.7 The effects of the crisis have been fairly modest for Germany and Austria. Their 
3-year average of almost all macroeconomic indicators lie above the respective average values of the 
EU-28. However, while it is obvious that Greece was hit particularly hard, macroeconomic indicators 
for France show a rather mild immediate impact of the crisis at first sight. Thus, even though almost 
all indicators for France do lie below the EU-28 average, its classification as a ‘crisis-hit’ requires 
further justification.  
National accounts do not fully reflect the serious structural weakness of France’s economy, which 
was relentlessly exposed by the economic downturn of the crisis (see Betz, 2015). In addition to an 
increasingly adverse balance of trade and rising socio-economic inequality, French companies were 
highly indebted, showed low profitability rates, and limited capacities for innovation, which resulted 
in an overall substandard competitiveness of the French economy (European Commission, 2014). 
While the country initially was less affected by the crisis than other large euro area economies, its 
recovery proved to be difficult. This became evident in the two years of near stagnation after 2012, an 
unemployment rate that got stuck above 10 percent and an increasing level of public indebtedness 
(European Commission, 2014; IMF, 2014). This major economic vulnerability of France had adverse 
psychological effects on large segments of the population (Betz, 2015). A pervasion of the French 
society by a ‘general sense of economic malaise’ (Pappas and Kriesi, 2015, p. 310 f.) eventually re-
sulted in a profound decline of public trust in political institutions and representative democracy in 
general. Not only on account of the country’s adverse macroeconomic prospects, but also because of 
this perceived sense of malaise and the consequential political malfunction I classified France as a 
‘crisis-hit’ country highly susceptible to populist mobilisation. 
Analysis 
Frequency distributions  
A party-specific analysis of frequency distributions per country shows that both fringe and mainstream 
parties make use of populist communication styles in their press releases (Figure 1). In all four coun-
tries, however, the usage of populism seems to be slightly more pronounced by parties on the fringes 
of the political spectrum. Within the populism of radical parties from both poles of the political spec-
trum, the elements of people reference and elite critique are predominant. Furthermore, the exclusion 
element seems to be a constituent that is specific to radical right-wing populism. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of populist press releases with anti-elitist and exclusive elements per party.  
 
Notes: Parties are arranged from the left to the right according to their ideological position on the political spectrum (country-specific center 
ground is indicated).  
 
 
 
However, not only parties from the radical Right make use of an exclusive strategy, since the ele-
ment also appeared in press releases from mainstream parties. Exclusive stances were found in the 
party communications of the Austrian social democrats SPÖ and the conservative Austrian people’s 
party ÖVP, in press releases of the German conservative Christian Democratic Union CDU and the 
German liberal party FDP, and some exclusive elements even appeared within populist press releases 
from the radical Left, including the German ‘die Linke’ and the Greek communist party KKE. These 
findings are in line with Jagers and Walgrave’s (2007) claim that, in general, every party on the politi-
cal spectrum may apply each of the three populism elements. These data also empirically confirm the 
proposition that exclusion is a rather prevalent feature of the radical Right’s populism. Furthermore, 
the cross-country comparison of the usage of populist party communication shows that the level of 
populism is considerably higher in crisis-hit France and Greece than in Austria and Germany. As 
shown in Figure 2, both German and Austrian radical left and mainstream parties direct their populist 
communication to the European rather than to the national community. 
 
 
 15 
Figure 2. Percentage of populist press releases with explicitly addressed demos (national vs. EU) per party. 
 
Notes: Parties are arranged from the left to the right according to their ideological position on the politi- cal spectrum (country-specific center 
ground is indicated); additional percentages (‘yes, a reference to an unspecified/other people’) are not pictured for reasons of readability.  
 
 
 
The exception is, however, the conservative party in Austria. While being basically EU-friendly 
and representing an inclusive European identity, the ÖVP is predominantly addressing its national 
community when applying populism. In the same way, the French conservative party Mouvement Dé-
mocrate is predominantly appealing to the national people, while the Greek Nea Dimokratia does not 
refer to a European community at all. Both in Greece as well as in France, there is a strong overall 
national focus among almost all parties. All appeals to the people in the two countries are primarily 
directed to the national population, regardless of a party’s position on the political spectrum. In mat-
ters of elite critique (Figure 3), Greek parties more often criticise the establishment of the European 
Union the more left they are on the political spectrum. In Austria, Germany, and France, fringe parties 
seem to criticise EU elites more than the mainstream parties. However, a more specific pattern regard-
ing the application of elite critique cannot be clearly distinguished from the frequency distributions 
below.  
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Figure 3. Explicit target of establishment-critique in populist press releases per party. 
 
Notes: Parties are arranged from the left to the right according to their ideological position on the political spectrum (country-specific center 
ground is indicated); additional percentages (‘yes, against the establishment of other specific EU member state(s)’, ‘yes, against other / 
unspecified establishments(s)’) are not pictured for reasons of readability.  
 
 
 
Multivariate analysis 
As indicated in Table 1, center parties score 24.48 percentage points lower on the scale for populist 
party communication compared to fringe parties. This speaks in favour of H1, which claims that the 
usage of populism is more pronounced on the fringes of the traditional political spectrum. However, 
this effect ceases to be significant if one takes into account a party’s policymaking position (i.e. being 
in office or not) and additionally differentiates between the two crisis-hit and the two crisis-spared 
countries.8 It is thus impossible to conclusively confirm hypothesis 1, although it is probable that the 
significant effect eventually dissolves due to the insufficient number of data points (n=28), given the 
four explanatory variables. Being a radical right party appears to have a highly significant (albeit ra-
ther weak) effect on the usage of populism with an exclusive element. Fringe parties from the Right 
score almost six percentage points higher on the scale for an exclusive populist communication style 
than extreme left and center parties. These findings are in line with the assumptions of H2 that radical 
parties from the Left predominantly use an anti-elitist type of populism while the exclusive element is 
neglected; whereas parties from the radical Right apply the element of exclusion more visibly and in 
addition to the classical establishment critiques in their populist communication.  
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Being a party on the right pole of the political spectrum has a significant and strong effect on the 
use of a nationally oriented populist communication style. Radical right parties are 24.85 percentage 
points higher than radical left parties in terms of using populism featuring a people reference directed 
to their own nation. However, compared to other parties, parties from the extreme Right do not, as 
expected, direct significantly more elite critiques to the EU establishment, which is why H3a is only 
partly confirmed. Furthermore, the usage of populism featuring an appeal to the people of the Europe-
an Union does neither significantly differ within radical parties, nor between fringe and mainstream 
parties. This means that H3b, claiming that parties from the radical Left might be appealing to the 
European community more visibly in comparison to radical right parties, cannot be confirmed.  
 
Table 1. Predictors of the Usage of Different Populist Communication Styles.  
Notes: Non-standardized OLS coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; omitted category is left-wing, all the regressions have high toler-
ance values (>0.40) and low values for VIF (<2.5), indicating that there are no severe multicollinearity effects present; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; 
*** p<0.001          
 
 
 
The results that ruling parties are almost 22 percentage points lower on the overall populism scale 
than opposition or non-governing parties are in line with H4. In matters of applying anti-elitist popu-
lism, the negative effect of being in government is highly significant. As expected, parties in power 
score much lower on the scale for criticism of national elites than non-governing parties. The overall 
level of populist party communication appears to be higher in the two countries that are more heavily 
affected by the crisis, which is indicated by the fact that Greek or French parties score higher on both 
the general and the anti-elitist scale for populism compared to Austrian or German parties. However, 
contrary to expectations stated in H5a, these parties obviously use significantly less exclusive ele-
ments within their populism, irrespective of their crisis-ridden environments. Eventually, there are 
some reasons in favour of H5b, because French and Greek parties apply more nationally oriented pop-
Model 1 Model 2 Type Level 
Popcom Popcom Anti-elitist Exclusive NATpop EUpop NATanties EUanties
Center -24.48* -4.762 -3.824 -0.938 6.813 4.442 9.696 -14.34
(9.236) (8.019) (7.975) (1.198) (6.931) (2.611) (7.337) (9.845)
Right-wing 2.503 7.015 1.586 5.429*** 24.85*** -0.651 6.967 -5.004
(10.22) (7.559) (7.517) (1.129) (6.533) (2.461) (6.916) (9.280)
Government -21.91** -22.24** 0.332 -11.09 -4.706 -33.57*** -8.671
(7.393) (7.351) (1.104) (6.389) (2.407) (6.763) (9.075)
Crisis-hit 21.66*** 24.07*** -2.408** 20.91*** -4.381* 18.20** -14.84*
(5.583) (5.552) (0.834) (4.825) (1.818) (5.108) (6.854)
_cons 50.48*** 32.43*** 29.95*** 2.480* 3.231 7.479** 38.57*** 41.14***
(7.728) (7.316) (7.275) (1.093) (6.323) (2.382) (6.693) (8.981)
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
adj. R-sq 0.293 0.622 0.616 0.646 0.627 0.278 0.626 0.154
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ulism compared to Austrian and German parties, regardless of their ideological or governmental posi-
tion. This significant effect, together with a strong positive coefficient for the usage of national estab-
lishment critique, affirms the trend towards a nationally oriented populism in the environment of a 
crisis-hit country. However, previous studies have shown that both French and Greek parties have 
already been inclined to employ a nationalist rhetoric before the crisis (e.g. Reungoat, 2010; Hal-
ikiopoulou et al. 2012). On this account, only a systematic analysis over time will be able to clarify 
whether or not the observed type of nationally oriented populism has actually been enhanced by the 
crisis. In any case, the results at hand concerning the effects of the crisis have to be handled with cau-
tion, as will be discussed more precisely in the next section.9 
Conclusion 
Many of the aforementioned assumptions are confirmed, yet this study has limitations. One limit is the 
low number of countries and their respective political parties under analysis. It might be helpful to 
analyse additional and more diversified countries in future studies in order to confirm and reinforce 
the results. The differences between Austria and Germany vs. France and Greece, for example, are 
above all assumed to root in the countries’ affectedness from the crisis. Yet it is possible that differing 
populist communication styles between the two German-speaking and the two Mediterranean coun-
tries might stem from unconsidered, country-specific parameters. The analysis of Vasilopoulou and 
colleagues (2014, p. 389), for instance, reveals that populism is a defining feature of the Greek politi-
cal system and ‘at the heart of Greece’s endemic domestic weakness’; therefore, populist communica-
tion styles are not necessarily a consequence but also a potential source of the country’s economic 
challenges. Moreover, the causes and consequences of the crisis varied considerably among crisis-hit 
countries, as did the rise and nature of their parties’ populist rhetoric. Therefore, further comparative 
research is needed, which is also focusing on an analysis of variation within these countries. On the 
basis of the results at hand, it is thus not possible to conclusively assess whether or not a crisis-ridden 
environment actually fosters populist rhetoric. For a start, however, this cross-country comparison 
tentatively supports former research on the assumption that economic (and political) crises are influ-
encing populist communication. 
Apart from this, it is nevertheless possible to fathom some of the questions asked at the com-
mencement of this article. What kind of party characteristics and situational factors did influence the 
selection of specific populist communication styles in the course of the 2014 EP election campaign? 
As a first finding, populist party communication appears to be more pronounced on the fringes of the 
political spectrum if compared to populism used by mainstream and government parties. These find-
ings are in line with previous findings on the relationship between radicalism and populism. However, 
as shown in the descriptive results, it is not only the fringe parties that are inclined to employ a popu-
list rhetoric. There is also a considerable extent of populism among mainstream parties, particularly in 
France and Greece, where populism is widespread among almost all political parties. In the case of 
Greek, these results clearly coincide with the work of Pappas (e.g. 2014) on the mainstream PASOK, 
which started to follow a distinct populist course since the 1980s and, through populist contagion to 
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other major parties, eventually transformed the entire party system into a so called ‘populist democra-
cy’. 
Across all countries and parties, populism is basically composed of a reference to the people and an 
establishment critique, while the element of exclusion is used significantly more often among populist 
parties from the Right than among parties in the center or on the left pole of the political spectrum. 
While this implies that exclusion is a central feature of populism from the extreme Right, the analysis 
of party-specific frequency distributions also points out that it is not solely a feature of the radical 
Right’s populist rhetoric, but it is a principle applied by various parties across the political spectrum. 
By showing that specific types of populism might be linked with ideologies while the elements of a 
populist communication style are not strictly bound to specific party positions, this study empirically 
confirms the complementarity of the perceptions of populism as an ideology and as a political com-
munication style.  
Furthermore, radical right parties more frequently target the national community when applying a 
populist communication style. Both findings are rooted in the extreme Right’s ideological orientation 
towards ethnic nationalism and the corresponding exclusive identity perceptions represented by this 
party family. However, while the results of this study allow for an explanation of the nationalistic as-
pect of populism it remains rather unclear under what conditions political parties are selecting a popu-
list communication style directed to the European community. Multivariate analysis did not reveal any 
significant difference between party families pertaining to the usage of appeals to the European demos. 
However, party-specific frequency distributions suggested that a pro-European populism in this vein 
seems to be existent among most of the political parties, and it appears to be slightly more pronounced 
among parties representing an inclusive European identity. The emergence of such a border-
transcending populist communication style in turn may actually arouse and enhance a European sense 
of community, which is of fundamental importance in order to legitimate any ambition for a deeper 
political integration of the EU member states.  
With regard to the element of exclusion, the low numbers of exclusive statements found in the data 
material were far too small for a meaningful quantitative analysis of the specific targets of the parties’ 
ostracism.10 Only 5.5 percent of all the press releases containing a people reference also feature an 
exclusionary stance. Although around 70.8 percent of this exclusivity originates from radical right 
parties, even in the extreme Right’s discourse the exclusive element is applied only to a minor degree. 
Meanwhile, these results are not all that dissimilar from the findings of Jagers and Walgrave (2007, p. 
331): While the Belgian radical right party Vlaams Blok is accountable for 71.2 percent of exclusivity, 
only about 9.2 percent of all the population mentioning passages analysed in their study were negative 
evaluations of specific population categories. In any case, one of the key findings of this study is that, 
contrary to intuitive expectations, the rhetoric of exclusivity towards other groups barely takes place 
within populist party communication. 
The same could be said for the sovereign debt crisis enforcing rhetorical exclusion of European 
member states amongst political parties. The putative cleavage between ‘donor’ and ‘debtor’ countries 
is more likely emanating from sensation-seeking mass media, whereas political parties are not exploit-
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ing this mean of divisiveness within their political discourse. First and foremost, political parties pass 
their electorate’s frustration and enragement on to domestic and European elites by means of funda-
mental establishment critiques. As a rather optimistic conclusion, one could therefore say that, despite 
the rising success of populist communicating parties during the 2014 EP elections, social cohesion 
within the European Union might be less endangered than the daily news coverage would cause one to 
believe. 
Notes  
1.  While the definition of populism as a political communication style is complementary to the defi-
nition of populism as an ideology, it is worth mentioning that most scholars do not understand 
populism as a complete ideology. Cas Mudde’s (2004) definition of populism as a ‘thin-centred’ 
ideology with its ability to attach itself to other host ideologies belongs to the most widely cited 
perceptions of populism. However, for an interesting discussion of whether or not populism 
should be defined as an ideology at all or rather be conceptualised as a discourse (or populist 
frame) see Aslanidis (2015). 
2.  The general project codebook with a full description of the variables’ design is available from the 
author upon request.  
3. All examples are taken from UK press releases that were employed during the coder training. 
4.  Thus, a statement also qualified as exclusive if it was featuring all three elements of populist rhet-
oric (i.e. thick populism), as the combination of a people reference in combination with solely an 
exclusive stance turned out to be very rare (6 out of 1934 press releases). 
5.  Descriptive statistics for each scale are provided in the Appendix. 
6. The subsequent analysis has also been conducted for an operationalisation which combines a 
party’s ideological positon and its government status in the categories ‘left-wing’, ‘right-wing’, 
‘centre-government’, and ‘centre-opposition’. In essence, the results of these alternative calcula-
tions do not differ from the original ones and are provided in the online supplementary infor-
mation. 
7.  A detailed list of all considered macroeconomic data is provided in the online Appendix.  
8.  Because this analysis is dealing with a very small sample size, single cases (here parties) may 
have a high influence on the regression estimates. Against this background, I conducted regres-
sion diagnostics for each model and used Cook’s D as a global measure of influence in order to 
identify potential outliers and their specific effects on the regression equation. For each model, I 
excluded all cases that exceeded the convention cut-off point for Cook’s D of (4/n), which is in 
our case 0.143, and rerun the OLS regression. All of the reported effects above remained signifi-
cant and did not change substantially even after removing influential data points, except for the 
effect in the last model indicating that parties in crisis-hit countries apply less criticism on the EU 
establishment. This effect dissolved after excluding Germany’s right-wing party AfD (Cook’s D 
= 0.1854) from the model. For a summary of the regression diagnostics please consider the online 
Appendix.  
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9. As France does not perfectly fit into the category of a crisis-hit country, I run additional OLS 
regressions where France is considered as an ambiguous case and is treated as the reference cate-
gory for the two dummy variables crisis-hit vs. crisis-spared instead. However, the results for 
H5a and H5b did not change substantially. The additional calculations are provided in the online 
Appendix.   
10. A closer look at specific press releases revealed, that the Austrian FPÖ predominantly attacked 
immigrants and minorities, while the BZÖ primarily railed against crisis-hit EU member coun-
tries, EU candidate countries, or Third Countries in general, without explicitly attacking any im-
migrants or minorities. In France, all the exclusive statements were originating from the Front 
National, and they mainly zeroed in on asylum seekers or immigrants from specific Third Coun-
tries. Greek parties in turn directed their criticism at immigrants and minorities in general. How-
ever, no specific pattern was apparent regarding the exclusionary statements of German parties, 
as they were all directed at different target groups.  
 
Appendix 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics: Scales for used elements and direction of populism 
 
 
 
 
 
List of table and figures in the online Appendix 
S1:  Alternative operationalisation for a party’s ideological position and government status. 
S2:   Country-specific macroeconomic data. 
S3:   Political position and number of press releases for Austrian, German, French & Greek parties. 
S4:   OLS regressions after identification of influential data points (Cook's D > 4/n). 
S5:   Alternative OLS regressions when France is not considered a crisis-hit country. 
  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics: Scales for used elements and direction of populism.
 Scale Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
popcom 28 38.95 22.51 5.66 87.06
anti-elitist 28 36.68 22.19 1.89 85.88
exclusive 28 2.27 3.47 0 10.75
NATpop 28 22.92 19.57 0 64.71
EUpop 28 5.83 5.3 0 18.18
NATantiestab 28 47.41 20.68 9.09 100
EUantiestab 28 21.89 18.46 0 66.67
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